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Regulating Robo Advisors: Old Policy Goals, New Challenges
Summary
Financial “robo advice”—an automated service that ranks or matches consumers to financial
products—has gained significant attention in the investment industry and on the Hill, but there has not yet
been a consensus on how to regulate these new services. Robo advisors often are on par with and can
exceed the standards of human advices, but they don’t fit into the category of fiduciary, and therefore
won’t be held to the same regulatory standard that humans advisors are. Nonetheless, they are subject to
systemic risks and the potential for abuses that can hurt consumers. Professors Tom Baker and Benedict
Dellaert offer a regulatory trajectory to follow as the technology of robo advisors continues to develop and
expand.
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In the popular press, a “robo advisor” is an automated investment service that
competes with human financial advisors by claiming to offer better advice and
service and, therefore, better investment returns, at a lower price.1
We use the term robo advisor more broadly to refer to
any automated service that ranks, or matches consumers to, financial products on a personalized basis,
sometimes in addition to providing related services
such as educating consumers and selling products
to them. The investment-focused robo advisors have
drawn the most attention from regulators,2 but the
promises and regulatory concerns raised by investment
robo advisors also apply to their insurance and banking counterparts.3
Because of the scale that automation makes possible, robo advisors have the potential to provide quality advice to more people at lower costs than humans,
and to do so with greater transparency.4 Yet the fact
that this potential exists hardly guarantees that it will
be realized. People design, model, program, implement,
and market robo advisors, and many robo advisors
operate behind the scenes, as they have done for many
years, assisting people who interact with clients and
customers. And the history of people taking advantage
of consumers in the financial services industry is not a
pretty one.5
Even setting fraud and other unsavory activities
to the side, the riches to be won by those who succeed
in “disrupting” the financial services industry provide

SUMMARY
• Because of the scale that automation makes possible, “robo
advisors” have the potential to provide quality advice on financial
investments to more people at lower costs than humans can,
and to do so with greater transparency. However, the systemic
risks and potential for abuses are significant too.
• While regulators of course need to be vigilant, it also is important they not over-react to the deployment of robo advisors.
For now, the standard against which robo advisors should be
compared is that of humans, who are far from perfect.
• This issue brief lays out four core technical components of
robo advisors that regulators need to understand and to develop procedures to assess. Because there is so little research
available to guide the regulation of robo advisors today, and
because the need for regulatory oversight will only escalate
as the sophistication and scale of robo advice increases, the
brief offers regulators a regulatory trajectory to follow.
• Robo advising could give rise to a fundamental shift in financial
regulatory strategy: from regulating the content of consumer
financial products to (a) facilitating access to the data that
robo advisors need and (b) taking appropriate measures to
verify the quality of the robo advisors and public accessibility
to them.
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more than enough incentive to rush
technology to market. In addition,
there are concerns that automation
may entrench historical unfairness6
and promote a financial services
monoculture with new kinds of unfairness and a greater vulnerability to
catastrophic failure than the less coordinated actions of humans working
without automated advice.7 Thus, robo
advisors pose significant challenges
for regulators seeking to preserve the
integrity of financial markets.
At the same time, however, it is
important not to over-react by setting
a higher bar for robo advisors than for
human advisors. For now, the standard
against which robo advisors should
be compared is that of humans, who
are far from perfect. Although it may
be appropriate to hold robo advisors
to a super-human standard someday,
their share of the roughly $25 trillion
U.S. personal investment market8 is
too small (see Figure 1), and regulators have too much to learn, to do so
today. Yet financial services regulators
do have substantial legal authority,
well-developed economic and historical justifications to guide their
actions, and a diversity of regulatory
tools to employ right now. It is time to
assess how they should respond to the
automation of robo advisors, espe-

cially when that automation extends
to helping consumers decide which
products to buy.
In this Issue Brief, we lay out
the traditional goals that financial
services regulation promotes: competence, honesty, and suitability.9 Any
well-designed robo advisor should
meet those goals at least as well as
(and most likely better than) a typical
human advisor, with a strong emphasis
placed on the caveat, “well-designed.”
We then identify four core technical components of robo advisors that
regulators need first to understand and
then to develop procedures to assess.

Our objective is to sketch the early
stages of a regulatory trajectory that
regulators can follow as robo advisors
develop in sophistication and scale.

JUSTIFYING ROBO
REGULATION
The aspects of financial services
regulation most likely to apply to
new robo advisors are those directed
at current consumer product intermediaries. Intermediaries like securities brokers, mortgage brokers, and
insurance agents and brokers have

FIGURE 1 LARGEST ROBO ADVISORS BY ASSETS, 2017 Q1
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NOTES
See, e.g., Rob Berger, “7 Robo Advisors That Make Investing Effortless,” Forbes, February 5, 2015; Arielle O’Shea,
“Best Robo-Advisors: 2017 Top Picks,” NerdWallet, June
23, 2017.
2 FINRA (March 2016), Report on Digital Investment Advice,
available at: http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digitalinvestment-advice-report.pdf.
3 Insurance robo advisors include Healthcare.gov (health
insurance) and Coverhound.com (auto and homeowners
insurance). We have not found any true robo advisors in the
banking context, but Zillow’s mortgage tools and NerdWal1

let’s credit card tools are a step in that direction.
Abhijeet Sinha (2016), “Increasing the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Financial Advice with Robo-Advisors,” Infosys.
5 See, e.g., Neil Fligstein & Alexander F. Roehrkasse (2016),
“The Causes of Fraud in the Financial Crisis of 2007 to
2009: Evidence from the Mortgage-Backed Securities
Industry,” 81 AM SOC. REV. 617; Michael Corkery, “Wells
Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Accounts,” New York Times, Sept. 8, 2016.
6 See, e.g., Kate Crawford, “Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy
Problem,” New York Times, June 25, 2016.
4

2

See, e.g., Cathy O’Neil (2016), Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens
Democracy. See also, Dario Amodei et al., “Concrete Problems in AI Safety,” arXiv.org: 1606.06565, July 25, 2016.
For an effort by the tech industry to address some of these
challenges, see www.partnershiponai.org.
8 Investment Company Institute (2015), Investment Company
Fact Book, available at: https://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_factbook.pdf.
9 Note that this description of the three goals is a conceptual
one that does not map perfectly on the diversity of financial
7
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the potential to help consumers make
better sense of the financial services
available to them and, accordingly, to
ameliorate the information imbalance
between consumers and the producers of financial products. But there
are significant challenges to reaching
this potential. Consumers are almost
as poorly equipped to identify the
quality of an intermediary as they are
to evaluate the quality of the financial
products. For example, because they
need the help of the intermediary
to evaluate those products, consumers cannot evaluate the quality of the
intermediary by evaluating the quality
of the intermediary’s recommendations. Moreover, the prevailing commission-based compensation regime
for intermediaries creates significant
conflicts of interests that lead to biased
advice.10 The justification for regulating robo advisors, therefore, is rooted
in the broad U.S. policy priority of
protecting consumers from being taken
advantage of due to their relative lack
of knowledge about financial products.

ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVES:
COMPETENCE, HONESTY,
AND SUITABILITY
At least for mass-market consumer
financial products, a well-designed

robo advisor should outperform most
humans in matching consumers to
financial products, while being as honest as the most honest humans.
For a robo advisor, the assessment
of competence and suitability go hand
in hand. By definition, a competent
robo advisor will only recommend
suitable products. Indeed, using difficult test cases to evaluate whether a
robo advisor consistently recommends
suitable products is one of the ways
to evaluate whether the robo advisor
is well-designed. Humans are different: even competent humans make
mistakes, and even competent humans
can be biased or dishonest.11 It is for
this reason that financial services regulators developed suitability and other
conduct standards that permit an
after-the-fact assessment of whether
intermediaries gave good advice.12
In terms of honesty, there are
different potential standards. At a
minimum, honesty means making
only true statements about the products, the advisor’s compensation, and
anything else that is relevant to the
products, the advice, and the purchase
process. Honesty also should include
accurately describing the basis for
any recommendations, making any
commonsense disclosures that might
be needed to correct a misimpression

that the advisor is considering all of
the products in the market if the advisor is not doing so, disclosing the existence of any compensation or other
arrangements that might have the
potential to bias the advice in a way
that is not consistent with consumer’s
interests, and providing advice that is
not biased in that manner.
A robo advisor will always provide
the advice that it is programmed to
provide, and it can be programmed
in a way that meets a demanding
standard of honesty: making only true
statements, disclosing the methods for
providing the advice, and providing
advice that considers only factors that
are consistent with the consumer’s
interests (insofar as it is possible to
know those interests). This more
demanding honesty standard should
be one important aspect of what it
means to be well-designed.
As existing investments robo advisors demonstrate, the product matching function can easily be automated
for investors who are prepared to
adopt the passive investing strategy
recommended by disinterested finance
researchers, as can some other aspects
of investing, such as rebalancing.13
Relationship management and other,
more difficult to model aspects of the
work of financial advisors are harder

NOTES
services regulations. Cf. Howell E. Jackson, “The Trilateral
Dilemma in Financial Regulation,” in Anna Maria Lusardi,
ed. (2008), Improving the Effectiveness of Financial Education and Savings Programs.
10 See, e.g., Council of Economic Advisors (February 2015),
The Effects of Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement
Savings, available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/blog/2015/02/23/effects-conflicted-investmentadvice-retirement-savings.
11 Sendhil Mullainathan et al. (2012), “The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study,” NBER, Working Paper No.

17929 (noting that financial advisors tend not to de-bias
their clients and instead often reinforce biases that are in
their interests).
12 Robert H. Mundheim (1965), “Professional Responsibilities
of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine,” Duke. L. J.
445, 44X (noting that the suitability standard developed
because educational, credentialing, and disclosure requirements were not adequate by themselves).
13 Passive investing refers to investing in funds that attempt
simply to match the performance of the class of securities
to which the fund is indexed. Robo advisors typically em-
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ploy algorithms to match consumers to a mix of exchange
traded (index) funds based on the consumers’ age, risk
tolerance, and time horizon, among other factors. Rebalancing is the process of periodically adjusting the mix of
investments so that differences in the relative performance
of the investments do not lead the investor’s portfolio to
shift away from the preferred mix.
14 Alex Padalka, “Vanguard and Schwab Hybrids Trump Pure
Robos in Assets,” Financial Advisor IQ, March 29, 2012.
15 For example, our research and that of our collaborator
Eric Johnson demonstrate how simple choice architecture
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NEW REGULATORY
CHALLENGES

to automate. The fact that so many
people who call themselves financial
advisors focus on selling financial
products that generate commissions
and fees, rather than on planning and
coaching, helps explain why regulators have focused on the incentives
that can distort the matching function
of financial advisors. Yet these other
services can be more important than
matching customers to products. For
this reason, the robo advisors with the
largest and fastest growing market
shares sell their services through or to
human financial advisors.14 As robo
advisors gradually replace the product
matching function and other functions
that are easily automated, it is possible
that in the retail consumer market,
financial advisors will largely replace
stock brokers and will compete based
on their ability to plan and coach.
Our sense is that the product
matching function is a bigger part of
what insurance and mortgage brokers
do, so it seems more likely to us that
they will be more completely replaced
by automated services. If not, however,
that will be because they also provide
additional, harder to automate services.

Although robo advisors can be
designed to ignore the misaligned
incentives that have historically
affected financial product intermediaries, most robo advisors are developed or purchased by these traditional
intermediaries. It would therefore be
naïve to simply assume that intermediaries will always choose the algorithms and choice architecture that are
best for consumers, rather than those
that are best for the intermediaries.15
Because there is so little research
and analysis available to guide the
regulation of robo advisors today and
because the need for and corresponding returns to regulatory oversight will
increase as the scale of robo advice
increases, we propose a regulatory
trajectory that starts by building the
necessary human capital. (The 2016
FINRA report cited in footnote 2
indicates that FINRA has begun to do
this, but they may benefit significantly
from collaborating with their counterparts in the banking and insurance
sectors.) Only then will regulators be
able to develop a strategy that adapts
to the scale and consequences of robo
advice in the market in a manner that
promotes both effective innovation, on

NOTES
techniques can be used to mislead consumers, especially
when combined with a biased or inaccurate ranking algorithm.
16 The regulators in the three key areas of financial services—for example, NAIC (insurance), FINRA and SEC (securities), and CFPB (banking)—may find it highly beneficial
to work together to achieve this level of expertise.
17 BlackRock (September 2016), Digital Investment Advice:
Robo Advisors Come of Age , available at: http://www.
blackrock.com/corporate/en-lm/literature/whitepaper/
viewpoint-digital-investment-advice-september- 2016.pdf.

Third parties may not maintain the information in a format
that is accessible or they may not be willing to provide the
information, whether because of concerns about fraud,
legal constraints on providing the data, or other reasons.
19 Hauser, John R., Glen L. Urban, Guilherme Liberali, and
Michael Braun (2009), “Website Morphing,” Marketing Science, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 202-223.
20 See, e.g., several October 2016 New York Times stories
about annuities in teacher pension plans.
18
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the one hand, and honest and competent robo advisors in the market, on
the other.
Regulators can start developing
the necessary capacities now, when the
stakes are smaller, and when consumers are still sufficiently uncertain about
robo advisors.16 Some firms may
actually welcome the legitimation that
could accompany independent certification of the quality of robo advice. At
least some powerful actors in the financial services sector likely will decide to
support such regulatory initiatives, if
only to be in a position to shape those
initiatives, as we think BlackRock—the
largest asset management company in
the world—has already signaled that it
is prepared to do.17
We have identified four core components of robo advisors that require
distinct capacities to assess: (1) the
ranking or matching algorithms and
related processes, (2) the customer
and financial product data to which
the algorithms or other matching
processes are applied, (3) the choice
architecture through which the advice
is delivered, and (4) the information
technology infrastructure.
1. RANKING OR MATCHING
ALGORITHMS

For robo advisors, the key algorithms
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are those that rank the financial products for eventual selection by consumers or, if the robo advisor makes the
selection, matches consumers with
products. For example, an investment
robo advisor might be programmed to
recommend that the mix of bond and
stock funds in a consumer’s retirement
savings portfolio gradually shift over
time so that the portfolio becomes
more heavily weighted with bond
funds as the consumer ages.
To assess the competence of these
algorithms, some of the information
that regulators could require from the
robo advisors include: explanations of
their models, the underlying data, and
the propriety of that data; explanations of the intended outcomes; and
evidence that the algorithms in fact
perform as designed (e.g., by requiring
the robo advisor to respond to difficult
test cases), among other things.
Regulators then will need to
exercise good judgment based on this
evidence, informed by domain-specific
expertise. They will require demonstrations that the algorithms do not
consider—directly or indirectly—factors that would bias the outcomes in
a way that is harmful for consumers.
For example, it would be improper
for a matching algorithm to consider
either the size of the commission paid
to the financial product intermediary or a proxy for that commission.
The capability to test the competence
and honesty of robo advisors represents a significant improvement
over a human-based system, as it has
been notoriously difficult to police
the practice of steering clients and
customers to the products that provide
the best benefits to the intermediaries,
not to the customers.

2. CUSTOMER AND PRODUCT DATA
Robo advisors’ only source of financial
product data is from product suppliers
(or their agents), and there are valid
business reasons why suppliers may
be reluctant to provide data, absent
robust legal reporting requirements.
The easy access to comprehensive,
public securities data may be the chief
reason that investment robo advisors
are more developed than other types
of robo advisors.
Customer data, on the other hand,
can of course be collected directly
from customers as part of providing
the robo advice to consumers. But that
can be burdensome for the customers, and they may not in fact possess,
or have easy access to, the data that
the robo advisor needs (e.g., detailed
asset/investment records for investment robo advisors and claim records
for insurance robo advisors). The more
efficient and accurate approach in
many cases would be to collect consumer data from third parties, but this
approach has its own limitations.18
With regard to data access, regulators should be asking three kinds of
questions.
1. Has the robo advisor obtained
access to reasonable sources of data,
and are there any concerns that an
inability to obtain data, particularly
regarding products, will bias the
rankings and matching in a way that
disadvantages consumers in relation
to intermediaries and sellers?
2. Where there are gaps in data, what
are the strategies that the robo advisor considered to address those gaps,
why did the robo advisor choose the
strategies that it employed, and were
those choices reasonable?
3. Does the regulator have the author5

ity, whether formal or informal, to
increase access to data and thereby
improve the quality of the robo
advice?
Even assuming the data are
available, there will be significant
problems regarding the completeness
and accuracy of the data (i.e., quality), particularly in the early stages
of the development of robo advisors.
Regulators will need to develop the
capacity to ask hard, domain-specific
questions about data quality and to
evaluate the responses.
3. CHOICE ARCHITECTURE

Behavioral science research demonstrates the very large effects that
choice architecture—the organization
of the context in which people make
decisions—can have on decisions. For
example, the order in which options
are presented, the number of options
that are presented, the attributes of
the options that are presented (and in
which order), the framing of options
(e.g., gain versus loss), all have major
impacts. This means the way that
robo advice is presented can have a
profound effect on whether and how
consumers use that advice.
The most important best practice
in this arena is to employ rigorous
experimental testing. That testing
provides a record that could be made
available for regulators to review in
order to assess whether the robo advisors have engaged in a meaningful and
empirically informed choice architecture effort. Experimental testing (and
verification that the testing occurred)
is easiest to do when the choice environment is fully automated.19 Testing
and verification is a more difficult
exercise the context of hybrid robo
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advisors, in which customers interact
with a person who operates the robo
advisor behind the scenes, and in the
many insurance contexts in which
customers do some of their shopping
online but then talk to a human insurance agent who closes the sale.
4. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
INFRASTRUCTURE

Assessing the security and stability of
information technology architecture
is an increasingly important aspect
of financial services regulation that
extends well beyond robo advisors.
Financial services regulators already
appear to recognize the need to
enhance their capacities in this area.
Accordingly, we will not address this
topic further, other than to offer two
related observations. First, IT infrastructure requirements that are too
demanding could serve as barriers to
entry for innovative new enterprises.
Second, regulators could address this
concern by developing a strategy for
new market entrants that increases the
level of scrutiny along with the scale
of the enterprise, and they might consider forgoing such scrutiny altogether
for early stage robo advisors, and those
with small market share, that only sell
their services to businesses that have
significant incentive to ensure that the
IT infrastructure will be adequate.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Both robo advisor technology and the
regulatory environment have a long
way to go before robo advisors begin to
reach their potential of delivering high
quality advice to a mass consumer market across the broad range of financial
services. But if we assume basic com-

petence and honesty for the moment,
we can look ahead to other regulatory
challenges and opportunities.
Automation presents two great
opportunities for regulators, namely
(1) a leap forward in the ability
to hold consumer financial product intermediaries accountable for
providing misleading, incomplete or
otherwise inadequate advice and (2) a
new approach to consumer financial
product regulation that supports more
diversity in the forms and features of
consumer financial products to better
match the heterogeneity of consumers.
Consumer product intermediaries
have long used complexity and choice
to take advantage of consumers, particularly those who are less sophisticated.20 In response, consumer protection advocates have called for a return
to “plain vanilla” financial products.
This is not because they believe that
vanilla is best for everyone, but rather
because the evidence shows that
choice and complexity lead to exploitation and regressive cross subsidies.
Once consumers have easy access to
robo advisors (and use them), however,
that analysis could change. A good
robo advisor—one that has access
to the data necessary for adequate
innovation—gives an unsophisticated
consumer more processing power than
even the most sophisticated consumer
working on her own. That could lead
to a fundamental shift in regulatory
strategy: from regulating the content
of consumer financial products to (a)
facilitating access to the data that robo
advisors need and to (b) taking appropriate measures to verify the quality of
the robo advisors and the public access
to them.
The main challenge is fostering a
6

market in which an evolving diversity of robo advisors and consumer
financial product intermediaries
compete based on the measurable
quality of their advice and related
services for consumers. As regulators
develop preferences about robo advisor design, and as regulated entities
come to understand those preferences,
oversight may lead to a convergence
of models, increasing the risk of
catastrophic failure. This risk may be
further exacerbated by new fiduciary
rules. As the U.S. moves closer to a
uniform fiduciary standard for human
advisors, it is possible, perhaps likely,
that this will greatly accelerate the
use of automated investment advice,
as human advisors tether themselves
to the safe harbor of the largest robo
advisor algorithms.

CONCLUSION
Regulators should take a more
active role in assessing robo advisors, increasingly so as they grow in
scale. As the demand for robo advice
increases, protecting the integrity of
financial markets will require the kind
of cross disciplinary cooperation that
regularly occurs in the domains of
health and environmental regulation.
The lawyers, economists, and behavioral scientists already involved in
financial services regulation will need
to understand enough about computer
and data science to craft and apply
new regulatory strategies, and the
computer and data scientists at the
forefront of robo advisor innovation
will need to understand enough about
legal structures and ways of thinking to help make the new regulatory
strategies sensible.
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